This paper studies identi…cation and estimation of the distribution of bidder valuations in an incomplete model of English auctions. As in Haile and Tamer (2003) bidders are assumed to (i) bid no more than their valuations and (ii) never let an opponent win at a price they are willing to beat. Unlike the model studied by Haile and Tamer (2003) , the requirement of independent private values is dropped, enabling the use of these restrictions on bidder behavior with a¢ liated private values, for example through the presence of auction speci…c unobservable heterogeneity. In addition, a semiparametric index restriction on the e¤ect of auction-speci…c observable heterogeneity is incorporated, which, relative to nonparametric methods, can be helpful in alleviating the curse of dimensionality with a moderate or large number of covariates. The identi…cation analysis employs results from Chesher and Rosen (2017) to characterize identi…ed sets for bidder valuation distributions and functionals thereof.
Introduction
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z Address: Adam Rosen, Department of Economics, Duke University, 213 Social Sciences Box 90097, Durham, NC 27708, United States, adam.rosen@duke.edu allows an opponent to win at a price she is willing to beat. An advantage of an incomplete model is that it does not require speci…cation of the mechanism relating bids to valuations. Results obtained using the incomplete model are robust to misspeci…cation of such a mechanism. The incomplete model may be a better basis for empirical work than the button auction model of Milgrom and Weber (1982) sometimes used to approximate the process delivering bids in an English open outcry auction.
On the down side the incomplete model is partially, not point, identifying for the primitive of interest, namely the common conditional probability distribution of valuations given auction characteristics. HT derive bounds on this distribution and show how to use these bounds to perform inference on the distribution and interesting functionals such as the optimal reserve price.
The question of the sharpness of those bounds was left open in HT.
The HT auction model was previously shown to fall in the class of Generalized Instrumental Variable (GIV) models introduced in Chesher and Rosen (2017) , henceforth CR. 1 The results in that paper were applied to obtain a characterization of the identi…ed set (sharp bounds) for the auction model as a leading example, and it was shown that there are observable implications additional to those given in HT that re…ne the bounds previously obtained. 2 The characterization of sharp bounds on valuation distributions was shown to comprise a dense system of in…nitely many inequalities restricting not just the value of the distribution function via pointwise bounds on its level, but also restricting its shape as it passes between the pointwise bounds.
In this paper we expand the application of the intuitively appealing restrictions on bidder behavior invoked by HT to non-IPV settings. Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 3 provide general characterizations that do not require IPV. These results provide a framework for identi…cation analysis incorporating further restrictions that appear in econometric models of auctions. Section 4 illustrates how the analysis can be applied to models that feature unobservable auction speci…c heterogeneity, a special and important class of models in which the IPV restriction does not hold.
Partial identi…cation has been usefully applied to address other issues in auction models since HT. Tang (2011) and Armstrong (2013) both study …rst-price sealed bid auctions. Tang (2011) assumes equilibrium behavior but allows for a general a¢ liated values model that nests private and common value models. Without parametric distributional assumptions model primitives are generally partially identi…ed, and bounds on seller revenue under counterfactual reserve prices and auction format are derived. Armstrong (2013) studies a model in which bidders play equilibrium strategies but have symmetric independent private values conditional on unobservable heterogeneity, and derives bounds on the mean of the bid and valuation distribution, and other interesting functionals. Aradillas-Lopez, Gandhi, and Quint (2013) study second price auctions that allow for 1 The …rst analysis of the identifying power of the HT model using the GIV framework is in Chesher and Rosen (2015) 2 In this paper we use the expression identi…ed set to refer to sharp bounds throughout. Non-sharp bounds are referred to simply as bounds or outer regions.
correlated private values. Theorem 4 of Athey and Haile (2002) previously showed non-identi…cation of the valuation distribution in such models, even if bidder behavior follows the button auction model equilibrium. Aradillas-Lopez, Gandhi, and Quint (2013) impose a slight relaxation of the button auction equilibrium, assuming that transaction prices are determined by the second highest bidder valuation. They combine restrictions on the joint distribution of the number of bidders and the valuation distribution with variation in the number of bidders to bound seller pro…t and bidder surplus.
The restrictions of the auction models we study are set out in Section 2. In Section 3 GIV models are introduced and the auction model is placed in the GIV context, and the identi…ed set for such models is characterized. The identi…ed set for an auction model with additive unobservable auction speci…c heterogeneity is characterized in Section 4. In Section 5 identi…cation analysis is carried out in the presence of an index restriction on the e¤ect of auction-speci…c observable heterogeneity.
Relative to nonparametric methods, this can be helpful in alleviating the curse of dimensionality with a moderate or large number of covariates. Section 6 provides numerical illustrations of bounds on the e¤ect of auction covariates on bidder valuations in such models. Section 7 concludes.
Model
We study open outcry English ascending auctions with a …nite number of bidders, M , which may vary from auction to auction. The model imposes the slight simpli…cations that there is no reserve price and the minimum bid increment is zero. These conditions simplify the exposition and are easily relaxed. 3 Auctions are characterized by a vector of observed …nal bids B, a vector of valuations V , and Z = (X; M ) comprising a vector of auction characteristics X and number of bidders M . B; V; Z are presumed to be realized on a probability space ( ; A; P) with sigma algebra A endowed with the Borel sets on . Valuations V are not observed. Final bids of those who place no bid are taken to be recorded at the lower bound of the support of bids, typically zero. Throughout the paper reference to "bids"should be taken to indicate …nal bids unless it is indicated otherwise. The way in which realizations of (B; Z) are observed across auctions renders their joint distribution identi…ed.
The goal of our identi…cation analysis is to determine what the joint distribution of (B; Z) reveals about the joint distribution of valuations conditional on Z. The notation G V jZ (Sjz) is used to denote the conditional probability that V is an element of S, P [V 2 SjZ = z], while G V jZ is used to denote the collection of such functions over all possible values of Z,
where R Z denotes the support of Z. Inequalities involving random variables, such as those in Restriction IPV (Independent Private Values). There are independent private values conditional on auction characteristics Z = z such that for all z 2 R Z , the valuations of bidders are identically and independently continuously distributed conditional on Z = z.
The approach taken here applies identi…cation analysis from CR, which automatically delivers sharp bounds for model primitives without need for a constructive proof of sharpness. Moreover, the analysis is applicable in the absence of the IPV restriction, and thereby establishes how the intuitively appealing restrictions 1-2 of HT can be much more broadly applied. We additionally consider the following exchangeability restrictions on unobserved valuations and observed bids, respectively.
Restriction EX-V (Exchangeability of Valuations). Conditional on auction characteristics Z = z, bidder valuations V = (V 1 ; :::; V M ) are exchangeable. In such cases the general approach to identi…cation analysis put forward here remains applicable, albeit at the cost of added notation to distinguish bidder identities or types. In this paper we shall impose Restriction EX-V throughout, and impose Restriction EX-B in only some of our results.
Restriction EX-B (Exchangeability of Bids
Restrictions 1-2 and IPV (and therefore EX-V) were imposed by HT. Restriction EX-B was not, and it is not required for their bounds to be valid.
Generalized Instrumental Variable models
This auction model falls in the class of Generalized Instrumental Variable (GIV) models introduced in Chesher and Rosen (2017) . We use the results in CR to characterize the identi…ed set (i.e. sharp bounds) for valuation distributions delivered by a joint distribution of M …nal bids.
A GIV model places restrictions on a process that generates values of observed endogenous variables, Y , given exogenous variables Z and U , where Z is observed and U is unobserved. The variables (Y; Z; U ) take values on R Y ZU which is a subset of a suitably dimensioned Euclidean space.
GIV models place restrictions on a structural function h : R Y ZU ! R which de…nes the admissible combinations of values of Y and U that can occur at each value z of Z which has support R Z .
Admissible combinations of values of (Y; U ) at Z = z are zero level sets of this function, as follows.
For each value of U and Z we can de…ne a Y -level set
which is singleton for all u and z in complete models, but not in incomplete models such as those studied here. Likewise, for each value of Y and Z we can de…ne a U -level set
GIV models place restrictions on such structural functions and also on a collection of conditional distributions
whose elements are conditional distributions of U given Z = z obtained as z varies across the support of Z, where G U jZ (Sjz) denotes the probability that U 2 S conditional on Z = z.
Unordered Final Bids
In an The GIV level set of unobservable U corresponding to that in (3.1) given the HT assumptions from observed bids B is
where m (B) denotes the index of the winning bidder.
A GIV structural function which expresses these restrictions, with bid vector B taking the role
3)
The auction model may thus be cast as a GIV model in which the structural function h is a known functional of the collection of conditional valuation distributions fF z ( ) : z 2 R Z g. We use the notation F to denote a collection of such conditional distribution functions, and F to denote those F permitted by the model, and which embody the researcher's prior information on the distribution functions F z ( ). 5
The conditional distribution of U given Z = z, denoted G z , is the joint distribution of M marginally uniform variates, i.e. a copula, and may vary with z. If however Restriction IPV is imposed, then the components of U are mutually independent conditional on Z and, for any set
is the probability that a random M -vector of independent uniform(0; 1) variates takes a value in the set S. In the absence of restriction IPV, the marginal distribution of each component of U given Z is uniform(0; 1), but the components of U may be correlated. We use the notation G to denote a collection of copulas fG z ( ) : z 2 R Z g, and G to denote those collections G which are admitted by the model speci…cation. For example, the conditional distributions G z could each be left unrestricted across di¤erent values of z, their dependence on z could be parameterized through an index function, or they could be explicitly parameterized by an M -dimensional copula.
Applying Theorem 2 and Lemma 1 of CR, the identi…ed set for the pair F z ( ) and G z ( ) are those such that for all sets S in a collection of test sets Q(h; z) the following inequality is satis…ed almost surely
The collection of test sets Q(h; z) is de…ned in Theorem 3 of CR. It comprises certain unions of the members of the collection of U -level sets U(y; z; h) obtained as y takes values in the conditional support of Y given Z = z. 6 The following theorem provides the formal result for the auction model where U (B; F z ) takes the place of U(Y; Z; h).
Theorem 1 Let F 2 F, G 2 G, and Restrictions 1-2 and EX-V hold. The identi…ed set for
are those collections of conditional distributions admitted by F and G such that for almost every z 2 R Z , for all S that are unions of sets of the form U (b; F z ), b 2 R B : Auction models employed in empirical work typically impose additional restrictions, which will further re…ne the set given by (3.5), and which, thinking of implementation, may facilitate estimation and inference. The remainder of the paper studies models with additional restrictions, and develops characterizations of the resulting identi…ed sets that re…ne those obtained using Theorem 1. To do this we turn to bounds on valuation distributions derived from knowledge of only the distribution of ordered …nal bids, that is using order statistics of the bid distribution, as were also employed in HT.
We show in the next section that when bids are exchangeable so that Restriction EX-B holds, then there is no loss of information in having knowledge of only the distribution of ordered …nal bids, in the sense that the identi…ed set obtained using the distribution of ordered …nal bids is sharp and is the same as that obtained using the distribution of unordered …nal bids. If Restriction EX-B does not hold, then the bounds derived from information in the distribution of ordered bids still apply, but they may not be sharp relative to the bounds obtained from the distribution of unordered …nal bids.
Ordered Final Bids
Let 
The notation e G z (S) is used to denote the probability placed on the eventŨ 2 S when this copula is G z ( ). The admissible collection of joint distributions for U conveyed by G z ( ) restricts the collection of admissible e G z ( ). 7
The following inequalities involving the order statistics of …nal bids B and latent valuations V set out in Lemma 1 are a consequence of Restrictions 1 and 2. The proof of the lemma, like all other proofs, is provided in Appendix A.
7 Thus the notation Gz (S) and e Gz (S) distinguises between a joint distribution of M marginally uniform(0; 1) random variables, and the joint distribution of the order statistics of M marginally uniform(0; 1) random variables, respectively. The dependence structure among the M marginally uniform(0; 1) components need not be known. 
In similar manner to HT, we can base identi…cation analysis on the restrictions (3.6) and (3.7)
on bid and valuation order statistics. We show that in fact when …nal bids are exchangeable, application of the GIV analysis to ordered bids and valuations delivers the same sharp bounds as are obtained using the information in the distribution of unordered …nal bids. The result appears in Theorem 2.
The restrictions (3.6) and (3.7) of Lemma 1 can be written as
and, on applying the increasing function F z ( ), they are as follows:
A GIV structural function which expresses these restrictions is
The structural function h is known up to the collection of distributions F fF z ( ) : z 2 R Z g, so we replace h in the de…nition of random sets e U(Y; z; h), instead expressingŨ -level sets as: Theorem 2 Let F 2 F, G 2 G, and Restrictions 1-2, EX-V, and EX-B hold. The identi…ed set for (F z ( ) ; G z ( ) : z 2 R Z ) are those collections of conditional distributions admitted by F and G such that for almost every z 2 R Z , for all S that are unions of sets of the form e U(y; F z ) for y 2 R Y .
where e G z (S) denotes the probability thatŨ 2 S conditional on Z = z.
Relative to Theorem 1, Theorem 2 simpli…es characterization of the identi…ed set when Restriction 3 holds. The simpli…cation lies in that the collection of inequalities de…ning the identi…ed set involves only probabilities featuring ordered bids. When considering test sets, one need only consider unions of sets (3.10) in whichũ 1 ũ M . This is an M ! fold reduction in the number of sets whose unions must be considered when constructing test sets S.
In Chesher and Rosen (2017) the identi…ed set for F z ( ), each z 2 R Z , was characterized when in addition Restriction IPV holds. With this restriction in place G z ( ) is known and e G z (S) is the probability that the order statistics of M i.i.d. uniform random variables belong to the set S, which is easily computed. In that paper a numerical illustration was provided for a two-bidder auction model in which the sharp characterization of the identi…ed set for F z ( ) re…ned the bounds previously available.
Auction Speci…c Unobservable Heterogeneity
In this section we consider a model in which auction speci…c unobserved heterogeneity a¤ects bidders'valuations. Allowing for such heterogeneity is important when the good being auctioned has some features observed by bidders, but not observed by the researcher, that have a common e¤ect on each bidders'value. The unobserved variable could for example be a measure of quality unavailable to the researcher.
Unobservable auction-speci…c heterogeneity has featured in a variety of auction models in the recent literature, with examples including Krasnokutskaya (2011 ), Armstrong (2013 , Roberts (2013), and Quint (2015) , where bidders exhibit behavior consistent with some de…nition of equilibrium.
This section examines the use of Restrictions 1 and 2, originally used by HT studying open outcry ascending auctions under the IPV restriction, to study identi…cation when auction speci…c unobservable heterogeneity is allowed. Both F z ( ) and F z+ ( ) are strictly increasing on their supports.
Restriction UAH introduces auction-speci…c unobservable heterogeneity. Both distributions F z ( ) and F z+ ( ) may vary with z. The joint distribution of V I V I 1 ; : : : ; V I M and V + is left unrestricted. The notation F + is used to denote a particular collection fF z+ ( ) : z 2 R Z g and F + denotes those collections of F + admitted by the model speci…cation. 10 The restriction that F z+ ( ) be strictly increasing can be easily relaxed at the cost of some notational modi…cation, but without substantive change to the subsequent results. 11
De…ne the random M + 1 vectors U andŨ as As in Section 3.2 we continue to work with bid order statistics, with each m th bid order statistic denoted Y m = B m:M . The notation G z (S) is used to denote the probability that U 2 S conditional on Z = z, with e G z (S) denoting the probability thatŨ 2 S conditional on Z = z for any S 2
. G denotes a particular collection fG z ( ) : z 2 R Z g and G denotes such collections which are admitted by the model speci…cation. G z (S) is used to denote the probability that the …rst M components ofŨ belong to any set S [0; 1] M . 
The set of feasible values of unobservableŨ as a function of Y is given by
With a slight abuse of notation, for any set
1 0 For example, F+ could specify that Fz+ ( ) does not vary with z. 1 1 For example, the analysis could then be carried out subject to minor modi…cation with the …nal component of both U andŨ simply de…ned as V + , and F 1 z+ (ũM+1) in the inequalities below replaced withũM+1.
denote the union of level sets e U (y; F z ; F z+ ) across y 2 Y R Y .
From Theorem 2 it follows that under Restrictions 1-2 and UAH, for each z the identi…ed set for (F z ( ) ; F z+ ( ) ; G z ( )) are those that satisfy
For any Y R Y the probability P [Y 2 Yjz] is identi…ed from knowledge of the joint distribution of (Y; Z). The probability e G z e U (Y; F z ; F z+ ) is the conditional probability of the event thatŨ 2 e U (Y; F z ; F z+ ) for some y 2 Y. That is 
Since max m=1;:::;M
where
Furthermore, whenũ 2 E (Y) occurs, then there necessarily exists some v + such that max m=1;:::;M
and it likewise follows that there exists some strictly increasing CDF F z+ ( ) such that forũ M +1 =
The M inequalities appearing in E (Y) can alternatively be obtained by di¤erencing the inequalities delivered by the HT restrictions 1-2 appearing in (4.1). By de…nitionŨ is an element of the set de…ned in (4.1) if and only if
since the combination of any such pair of inequalities for a given m implies
Looked at in this way the inequality appearing in (4.3) is obtained in similar manner to the derivation of observable implications in which …xed e¤ects do not appear in panel data models. Here the auction-speci…c unobservable is akin to a …xed e¤ect that appears in each of the inequalities delivered by restrictions 1-2. Combining these inequalities appropriately produces further observable implications from which the common unobservable term 
and consequently 
The development using CR from which (4.5) was obtained allows us to establish that without additional restrictions placed on F z+ , these inequalities characterize sharp bounds on (F z ( ) ; G z ( )).
The following theorem collects the formal results.
Theorem 3 Let Restrictions 1-2, EX-V, EX-B, and UAH hold and let F 2 F, F + 2 F + , and G 2 G. Then (i) The identi…ed set for fF z ( ) ; F z+ ( ) ; G z ( ) : z 2 R z g are those admitted by F; F + ; G that satisfy, for almost every z 2 R z :
(ii) With no restrictions placed on F + , the identi…ed set for fF z ( ) ; G z ( ) : z 2 R z g are those admitted by F; G that satisfy, for almost every z 2 R z :
(iii) With no restrictions placed on F + , the identi…ed set for fF z ( ) : z 2 R z g are those admitted by F such that for some G z ( ) admitted by G, (4.6) holds. If, in addition, Restriction IPV holds, then Ũ 1 ; :::;Ũ M is distributed independently of Z such that G z ( ) corresponds to the joint distribution of the order statistics of M 1 independent uniform(0; 1) variables, and for any F z ( ) the probability on the right of (4.6) is known.
In addition to characterizing identi…ed sets under the stated restrictions, Theorem 3 provides a starting point for examining further simpli…cations of these characterizations that may be attainable under particular restrictions on F, F + , and G. For example, the theorem allows for, but requires neither independence of observed characteristics Z and latent auction heterogeneity V + , nor independence between V + and V I . Such restrictions may allow further simpli…cation of these characterizations.
Observable Auction Speci…c Heterogeneity
In this Section we show how information on the e¤ect of observable auction characteristics on valuations can be extracted from English auction data. There is good reason to be interested in the impact of observable auction characteristics on bidders' valuations. The survivor function of the distribution of valuations is e¤ectively the demand function faced by the seller and the coe¢ cients inform us about the sensitivity of demand to variations in the characteristics of the item for sale.
We now introduce an index restriction on the e¤ect of observable auction heterogeneity on individual valuations. The analysis of this Section delivers inequalities that de…ne an outer region for the index coe¢ cients which apply under general forms of departure from IPV. For each m 2 M 2; :::; M , letG V (Sjm) denote the conditional probability thatṼ + is in S given M = m. The identi…ed set for ;G V can be represented as those that satisfy
Restriction IR (Index Restriction
where Q m denotes unions of sets of the form given in (5.2). A class of sets which is guaranteed to contain all such sets, and which depends neither on observed variables nor on is given by the
where RṼ + jm denotes the conditional support ofṼ + given M = m and
Thus we can write the identi…ed set for ;G V as those that satisfy
Note that we could remove from the collection of test sets S m those which can be written as These bounds can be used to place limits on the relative impact of the components of observable auction characteristics X on bidder valuations as we demonstrate in Section 6.
Containments and Capacities
In consideration of inequalities of the form (5.5), consider a test set S S (A m ) for a given m.
The containment functional is
The capacity functional for a test set S = S (A m ) is 
for any vector a 2 R m+1 whose components are ordered from smallest to largest. Likewise, it is to be understood that the components ofṽ + 2 R m are ordered such thatṽ
The conditional containment functional for such a contiguous union is
The corresponding conditional capacity functional is
And so (5.5) applied to such contiguous unions produce the inequalities
which must hold for possible numbers of bidders m 2 M and for all a 1 a m a 0 m .
Illustrative calculations
In this section we specify a particular class of structures for generating …nal bids made by M = 3 bidders which embodies auction-speci…c observed heterogeneity X which enters via a linear index as set out in Restriction IR. Idiosyncratic elements of valuations are allowed to be correlated and bidding strategies can be X-dependent.
We calculate outer regions for index coe¢ cients using various selections of the inequalities given in (5.6). The probabilities in those inequalities are calculated as relative frequencies of the occurrence of the required events at each value of X observed in 10; 000 simulated auctions. We take this approach because calculation by other means of probabilities in the complex auction mechanism considered is infeasible. We …nd that the outer regions are quite informative and respond as expected to changes in the choice of inequalities employed.
The speci…cation of bidders'valuations is set out in Section 6.1 after which the auction mechanism is described in Section 6.2. The calculation of outer regions using grid search is described in Section 6.3.
Valuations
The log valuation of bidder j amongst M bidders is denoted V j and determined as
where V Each element of X has support on f 1; 0; 1g, each value (x 1 ; x 2 ) 2 f 1; 0; 1g f 1; 0; 1g occurs with probability 1=9 and = ( 1; 1).
The distribution of X is symmetric around zero with support f 2; 1; 0; 1; 2g and with probability 2=9 on jX j = 2 and probability 4=9 on jX j = 1. The variance of X is 1 1 3 . The variance of the unobserved elements of each log valuation is 2. 
Auction mechanism
Each bidder j of the M bidders is assigned a valuation, V j , as above and also the value j of a random bidding fraction, j . Bidding fractions vary across auctions in a manner determined by the value of the auction speci…c characteristics X.
Bidding fractions are independent across bidders and independent of the components of valuations and when X = x they are realizations of Beta( 1 (x); 2 (x)) random variables where
These Beta distributed random variables have support on [0; 1], with median and 10 th and 90 th percentiles given X = x as shown in Table 1 .
At each round i, bidder j is chosen from the remaining eligible bidders. The eligible bidders are those with valuations exceeding the bid on the table, b, zero in the …rst round, excluding the bidder who placed the bid on the table. At round i the chosen bidder, j, bids the amount j V j + (1 j )b. The auction proceeds until there remains one bidder. The mechanism results in …nal bids that satisfy the HT conditions.
Calculations using grid search
We simulate 10; 000 auctions and calculate the conditional on X = x probabilities in (5.6) as relative frequencies of occurrence of the events indicated amongst the simulated auctions for each value x under consideration.
Inequalities as given in (5.6) are determined by M + 1 ordered values on the extended real line, (a 1 ; : : : ; a M ; a 0 M ), which de…nes a contiguous union of U -level sets. In the calculation of a particular outer region reported here the inequalities employed are obtained using the contiguous Table 2 . The values in list L(6) all appear in the list L(11) so the identi…ed sets obtained using L(11) are subsets of the identi…ed sets obtained using L(6).
Grid search was conducted with each list of x values, L(6) and L(11). The resulting outer regions are shown in Figure 1 . Table 3 shows projections of the identi…ed sets onto the 1 and 2 axes. Moving from 53 to 253 inequalities results in a signi…cant reduction in the identi…ed set.
Concluding remarks
The characterizations using the CR Generalized Instrumental Variable model development open the door to the use of Restrictions 1-2 in auction models that do not require independent private values. These restrictions on bidder behavior, introduced by HT, are intuitively appealing in open outcry auctions where the usual button auction equilibrium may not be an appropriate model of bidder behavior. HT showed that even though these restrictions may seem a strong relaxation of Figure 1 : Identi…ed sets obtained by search on a 50 50 grid. Points in the identi…ed set using L(11) shown in blue. Points in the identi…ed set using L(6) shown in turquoise and blue. The value of ( 1 ; 2 ) in the structure generating …nal bids is ( 1; 1), marked in yellow.
the restriction that bidders play equilibrium strategies, and they render the model incomplete, they can still be used to learn useful information about valuation distributions in a model with IPV.
In many auctions studied in empirical research, the IPV paradigm may be questionable, and this has sometimes motivated the use of auction models that allow for private values. In Theorems 1, 2, and 3 characterizations of identi…ed sets for model primitives were developed in model that do not require IPV. Theorem 3 in particular applies to models that allow for a¢ liated private values through auction-speci…c unobservable heterogeneity, which has been a focus of some recent papers in the literature, see for example Krasnokutskaya (2011 ), Armstrong (2013 , Roberts (2013) , and Quint (2015) .
Bounds were additionally developed on the e¤ect of observable auction characteristics on bidder valuations in a model incorporating a familiar index restriction. Numerical illustrations of these bounds based on simulated auction models were presented, illustrating the potential for the bounds to be informative. In the case considered in which covariate coe¢ cients were 1 and 1 the identi…ed set pinned down the values of these coe¢ cients to within plus or minus 20%.
The bound characterizations and identi…ed sets for these English auction models involve a dense system of inequalities. In CR it was demonstrated in the IPV setting that these inequalities restrict not only the level of the bidder valuation distribution function at each point on its support but also the shape of the function as it passes between the pointwise bounds. The richness of the collection of inequalities characterizing identi…ed sets in non IPV setting is also potentially informative about model primitives and functionals of these in models in which IPV is not assumed. The application of these inequalities to perform inference using real world auction data is a direction in which we are continuing to work. For the purpose of the proof, …x z 2 R Z at an arbitrary value. All probability statements below are to be understood to be conditional on Z = z.
Let W be a random M vector de…ned on ( ; A; P) distributed G z ( ) and independent of B. 
Then (A.2) is equivalent to

